and that to attempt to eliminate either of these aspects of the law is to denature and falsify it.
Lon L Fuller

I Introduction
In articulating the juridical relationship between the individual and the state, legal theorists invariably attempt to reduce their subject matter to one of its aspects. For some, the fundamental insight that a theory of law must capture is that law is simply the sum of norms validated through the contingent exercise of an authoritative fiat. Others maintain that a theory of law must account for the timeless character of reason or justice, to which the actions of all private persons and public officials must conform.
The central difficulty that any theory of law must confront is, on the one hand, that legal practice involves the interplay of what Fuller called 'fiat' and 'reason' -or what I will call 'authority' and 'justice' -and, on the other, that these components appear to be antagonistic rather than complementary.
2 Justice denies the adequacy of what authority establishes. Authority denies the actuality of what justice demands. Since the norms that are authoritative within a given legal system are often unjust, while just norms too often fail to be legally authoritative, a legal theory cannot hold that persons are simultaneously bound both by the sum of t the core of law lies an essential dichotomy between the principle of legal certainty and the claim to justice. This feature of certainty and justice -both of them being fundamental values in law, and yet each colliding with the other -has been a source of serious theoretical problems. And the reason is not far to seek: because both bear a fundamental status, any comprehensive theory of law needs to make sense of both, no matter if the relationship they stand in its conflictive or otherwise. Different general approaches to law have dealt with the essential dichotomy, but by and large they have been skewed toward either certainty or justice, giving only a partial account of the other. ' validly enacted norms and by the eternal precepts of justice. Rather, the line of thought goes, a theory must focus on either authority in abstraction from justice or justice in abstraction from authority. Fuller lamented that in 'dealing with the antinomy of reason and fiat, the main effort of the various schools of legal philosophy has been to obliterate one of its branches.'
3 After so many attempts to render legal practice intelligible by reducing it to one of its aspects, whether the sum of rules validated by the relevant authority or the norms of justice, my purpose in the present article is to begin to elaborate and defend a theory that situates each of these aspects within an integrated whole and thereby illuminates the relationship that obtains between them. Because this framework rejects the fragmentary tendency of competing theories to reduce legal practice to either the exercise of authority or the norms of justice, I call it the 'unified theory.' Because this framework concerns the relationship between rulers and ruled rather than the relationship between private parties, the subject matter of the unified theory is public law.
The standard way to overcome an antinomy is to identify the problematic presupposition that generates its conflicting branches. In the relationship between rulers and ruled, the antinomy arises from the recognition that persons cannot be simultaneously bound by what the authority enacts and by what justice demands: for authority and justice might pull in opposite directions and no one can serve two masters. Consequently, a dichotomy forms between theories that reduce the whole of this relationship to either the sum of norms enacted by the relevant authority or the demands that justice imposes upon conduct. This article elaborates an alternative to these one-sided approaches. My guiding idea is that public law is a juridical relationship between rulers and ruled, in which each party has distinctive rights and duties. Rulers have the right to exercise public authority by imposing coercible legal obligations on the ruled. In turn, the ruled have the right to just governance, which imposes a corresponding obligation on rulers. Because notions of authority and justice bind different parties to the public law relationship, no contradiction arises from uniting them in a common framework.
I present the unified theory of public law through a conceptually sequenced elaboration of the right of persons to interact with others on terms of equal freedom. In the first section, I sketch a justification of the 'principle of authority,' which relates the right of government to impose, interpret, and enforce valid legal obligations to the corresponding duty of private persons to obey public lawgiving. I then argue, in the second section, that the justification of the right of government to exercise public authority implicates a distinctive moral standard for assessing the adequacy of existing legal systems and directing their reform. The 'principle of justice' relates the right of persons to just governance to the corresponding duty incumbent on government in the exercise of its authority. The distinguishing feature of the unified theory is its claim that, when authority and justice are appropriately conceived and justified, they are neither antithetical virtues of opposing theoretical frameworks nor isolated notions. Instead, authority and justice are the mutually implicating constitutive and regulative aspects of the public law relationship between rulers and ruled. The right of rulers to exercise public authority is always accompanied by a duty to govern justly, while the right of the ruled to just governance presupposes the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. In the third section, I defend the unified theory from an objection raised by generations of legal positivists, from Bentham to the present day, which claims that any theory that appeals to moral concepts to elucidate the concept of law must inevitably fail to recognize a legal truism: a particular law or a legal system might be valid even though it is unjust. I argue that the unified theory is not vulnerable to this objection because, in articulating what a legal system is, it provides resources for thinking about what makes a particular law or a legal system as a whole just. The justification of the right to exercise public authority implicates the relevant moral standard for assessing the adequacy of its instances. 4 4 The inspiration for the unified theory of public law lies in a reinterpretation of Immanuel Kant's legal theory. For the purposes of the present article, however, I will present Kant's insights apart from the thorny interpretive issues surrounding his difficult texts and his dense technical vocabulary; The central aim of this article is to articulate the normative structure of a legal system by untangling the interrelationship between its animating principles, the principle of authority and the principle of justice. Two clarifications about this aim are in order from the outset. First, because my focus is on the interrelationship between these principles, I cannot purport to provide an exhaustive account of either. Rather than offer a comprehensive theory of public authority or a comprehensive theory of public justice, I hope to say enough about each principle and about their interrelation to motivate an integrated approach to thinking about the normative structure of a legal system. Second, because this approach integrates principles of authority and justice that together set out the rights and duties that structure the relationship between a legal system and its members, I call it the 'unified theory of public law.' Public lawyers might be puzzled by this label. After all, public law is often identified with reference to the institutional and doctrinal matters that make up constitutional and administrative law. These include issues of constitutional design, federalism, interpretation, and the appropriate relationship between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. From this standpoint, the identification of a theory of public law with the exposition of the juridical relationship between rulers and ruled may be startling. However, I believe both that any overarching treatment of constitutional and administrative law presupposes an account of this relationship and that the account that I articulate has significant ramifications for these areas of law. Given the aim of this article, I cannot discuss these questions here. II 
The principle of authority
Public authority is a troubling idea. It is the idea that the ruler (or rulers) of a legal system has the right to change the normative situation of the ruled by conferring rights, powers, or immunities, or -more problematically still -by imposing coercible obligations. 5 The reason that public authority is a troubling idea is that it seems to unduly augment the freedom of the ruler and to correspondingly diminish the freedom of the ruled. The very notion of public authority, apart from how it is Kant formulates a theory that justifies the authority of existing states, elucidates the nature of a just state, and expounds the ongoing duty of government to bring its authoritative arrangements into the deepest possible conformity with the requirements of justice. exercised in particular instances, seems to conflict with our considered conviction that each person has a right to independence, conceived of as the freedom to determine and pursue his or her own purposes, and a duty to respect the right of all others to the same. If each person is free and equal in the sense that each is his or her own ruler, then any division of persons into those who rule and those who are ruled stands in urgent need of justification. The reason why public authority is problematic indicates the basis on which it must be justified. An adequate justification must establish that public authority is consistent with the right and the duty of each person to interact with every other on terms of equal freedom. In this section, I will provide a sketch of the justification of the principle of authority by arguing that, in the absence of publicly authoritative legislative, executive, and adjudicative institutions that establish, interpret, and implement law, private persons could not interact with one another on terms of equal freedom. Since persons must interact on such terms, they must interact in the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. 6 Suppose that private persons interact in a condition devoid of public institutions that establish, enforce, and interpret legal norms.
In the absence of a legislative institution capable of enacting general laws that publicly establish what is permitted, prohibited, or required, private persons might offer their own proposals about the norms that are appropriate for ordering interaction on terms of equal freedom. The problem that such an arrangement raises is neither that persons are unlikely to make proposals in good faith nor that given certain human tendencies the proposals are likely to disappoint, but that any proposal is simply a unilateral assertion. Since each person is the equal of every other, no one has standing to unilaterally impose a common set of rights that each person possesses or duties that each person owes. And since each person is free, each person may bring the idea of equal freedom to bear on particulars in whatever way seems good and right in her own eyes. In a condition in which every juridical agent is a private person, the problem of unilateral lawgiving is irresolvable. For if the idea of equal freedom can be rendered determinate with respect to particulars through a variety of general norms, and if different persons are not subject to a common set of determinations, then persons do not interact on the basis of a common set of restrictions on freedom. The solution to the problem of unilateral lawgiving is institutional. Private persons must submit to a publicly authoritative legislative institution that possesses a right that all private persons lack, the right to enact a common set of general norms that bind private persons in their conduct. Now suppose that there is a public legislative institution that enacts general laws but no institution capable of interpreting those laws in cases in which their meaning is disputed. Disputes regarding the meaning of legal norms remain possible because, if norms are to govern action, they must be more general than the particulars to which they apply. Thus, even when legal norms are publicly promulgated through a legislative institution, disputes may arise about their meaning with respect to a contingent occurrence. We may have a dispute about who owns a particular piece of property or about where your property ends and mine begins. Or we may have a dispute about whether we have entered into a contract or about how the terms of that contract are to be interpreted. In the absence of a public adjudicative institution, legal disputes cannot be resolved rightfully. The reason that disputes cannot be resolved rightfully is not that private persons are selfish or averse to cooperation, but that the parties to the dispute, being free, are each entitled to assert their own interpretation of the rights and duties apposite to their interaction, and being equal, are not required to yield to another's judgment about the rights that either possesses and the duties that either owes. In the event of a legal dispute, I am entitled to stand on my right and refuse to capitulate to your contrary claim. But the same is true for you. The result is a deadlock in which each of us may insist on our own unilateral judgment about what law requires and refuse to defer to the other. Just as each party has a right to reject the unilateral judgment of the opposing party to the dispute, so too each party to the dispute has a right to reject the unilateral judgment of any other private person. When persons interact in a condition populated exclusively by private persons, disputes cannot be resolved rightfully. The solution to the problem of unilateral judgment is to submit private disputes to the authority of a public judiciary. The judiciary resolves disputes, not by enabling one private person to unilaterally determine the rights and duties of another, but by providing an impartial public forum for the interpretation of a disputed legal norm. Because the judiciary is not a private party, it enables disputes to be resolved without subjecting either party to the unilateral judgment of another private person or imposing a unilateral judgment through a violent act.
Finally, suppose that there are legislative and adjudicative institutions but no executive institution empowered to implement and enforce the law. I may limit myself to exercising my freedom in a manner that respects your own, as established by a legislature or determined by the verdict of a court. But by acting in a manner that respects your independence, I have no assurance that you will reciprocate by acting in a manner that respects mine. In the absence of an executive power that protects the independence of each person with respect to every other, the independence of each person remains subject to the choice of other private persons. Others need not violently interfere with my rights, but whether they do so depends not on my entitlements as a member of a system of equal freedom, but on the particular purposes that they happen to have. In the absence of a public executive institution, the independence of each person remains subject to the unilateral acts of all others. Like the problems of unilateral lawgiving and unilateral judgment, the solution to the problem of unilateral enforcement is institutional. By exercising public coercion to protect the independence of private persons in relation to one another, an executive institution distinguishes public authority from an empty recommendation: public legislation is to be implemented, verdicts handed down by courts are to be enforced, and violations of law are to be prevented, detected, and prosecuted. In a legal system, private rights are secured through public coercion.
A public authority is comprised of legislative, adjudicative, and executive powers, which together form the condition in which private persons can enjoy their independence in relation to one another. This condition is a regime of public law. Such a condition supplants unilateral lawgiving with public legislation, unilateral judgment with public adjudication, and unilateral enforcement with public implementation of legal norms. Together, these institutions create a condition in which private persons may interact on the basis of publicly established norms and modes of adjudication and enforcement rather than the force of one or the goodwill of another. Each of the institutional powers of a legal condition is necessary to secure the independence of private persons in relation to each other, and each is a power that no private person can possess. Through its legislative will, the government acts on behalf of all private persons by providing a public determination of what is lawful and by empowering officials to enforce the law and adjudicate disputes about its meaning. Laws imposing obligations and conferring rights and powers cannot be enacted in the absence of a legislative power, disputes cannot be resolved rightfully in the absence of a publicly authorized judicial power, and persons cannot have assurance that others will respect their independence in the absence of a publicly authorized executive power. Because the government acts on behalf of all private persons as a whole, no private person is subordinated to another by obeying public legislation, accepting the verdict of a judge, or yielding to authorized exercises of executive power.
Regardless of whether a state of nature ever existed, private persons have a coercible obligation to interact with others in a legal condition.
The public institutions of a legal system create the conditions in which each person within it can enjoy his or her right to independence in relation to every other. Because interacting with others in a condition of public law is compatible with the right of every person to independence and interacting in a lawless condition is incompatible with the independence of anyone, every person must interact with all others in a condition of public law. The person who seeks to engage in lawless interaction rejects the legal condition in which all can enjoy their independence in relation to one another for a lawless condition in which none can. Persons who interact with others but refuse to submit to the public authority of a legal system may be compelled to do so, because their refusal is incompatible with the independence of everyone, while their inclusion within a legal system is compatible with the independence of everyone, including their own. Further, the legal system to which a private person must submit is the legal system that that person occupies. Since rightful interaction requires that private persons interact on the basis of common norms of conduct, and different legal systems might promulgate a variety of different norms, no private person can enjoy a right to disregard the public authority of the legal system that he or she inhabits. Such a right would make the possibility of rightful interaction with others on the basis of common norms depend on the particular features of the legal systems to which particular persons happened to claim allegiance.
Having justified the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions that jointly comprise a government, we can now characterize the relationship between government and the private persons who are bound by it.
The 'principle of authority' relates the right of government to rulethat is, to exercise public authority over its members -to the corresponding duty of the ruled to obey. A 'government' is the sum of publicly authoritative institutions that represent the people as a whole by subjecting each of its members to common lawgiving, adjudication, and enforcement. A 'people' is the totality of private persons subject to common governance. The presence of publicly authoritative institutions distinguishes a lawless condition from a condition of public law. In a lawless condition, every juridical actor is a private person. In a condition of public law, all private persons are subject to the authority of public institutions. The people acts, not through the unilateral actions of its particular members, which being unilateral are incapable of imposing obligations on all others, but through the powers of the publicly authoritative institutions that comprise its government. 7 The 'rule of law' consists in the lawful exercise of public authority. The rule of law is possible only in a condition of public law; that is, a condition in which there is an authoritative process for the promulgation of legal rules. Under the rule of law, all private persons are subject to publicly enacted standards of behaviour. These standards demarcate a publicly knowable domain of permissible action in which persons may formulate, develop, and pursue their own purposes in relation to one another. Interaction between private persons occurs in accordance with the rights that each is publicly known to possess and the duties that each is publicly known to owe. If persons are to conduct their affairs in accordance with law, lawgiving must be, inter alia, general, publicly knowable, prospective, clear, consistent, possible to obey, and relatively stable. 8 In to duties'; Perry, 'Political Authority,' supra note 5 at 33. Perry explains that the distinction is not merely of technical significance. It matters because if the correlate of a power to impose a duty was itself a duty, then in the absence of a duty incumbent on the ruled, one might conclude that there was no corresponding power of the rulers. But such a conclusion would be erroneous because it overlooks the possibility that public authority exists prior to its exercise, in which case private persons are not subject to duties but rather liable to be subject to duties. Perry's point, which he formulates as the 'prospectivity condition,' is that the liability to be subject to a duty must exist at the time of that duty's enactment; ibid at 5, 34-7. Thus, any theory in which the 'argument for the conclusion that a given state possesses legitimate moral authority which depends on facts that only come into being at a time subsequent to the enactment of laws must be treated as suspect'; ibid at 35. The unified theory retains the correlates of right and duty without violating Perry's prospectivity condition. Private persons who interact with others have a duty to interact in the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. This duty obtains both in a lawless condition and in a condition of public law. In a lawless condition, private persons have a duty to enter into a legal condition. The violation of this duty is a wrong because it is incompatible with the formation and maintenance of a legal condition in which persons can enjoy their independence in relation to one another. In a condition of public law, the same duty requires that private persons submit to the existing public authority. A public authority is not present whenever persons have a duty to submit to it. For such a duty obtains in a lawless condition, but also in a legal condition in which a plurality of persons is subject to common legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. According to the justification of public authority supplied by the unified theory, that persons are under a duty rather than a liability to be subjected to duties is evident because persons can act wrongfully prior to the public authority's enactment; for example, by doing what lies in their power to perpetuate a lawless condition. Whereas Perry notes that public authority can exist prior to the particular duties enacted through its exercise, the unified theory holds that the duty to submit to the governance of public institutions precedes the existence of public authority. Since both of these positions retain the possibility that public authority (whether conceptualized as a right or a power) is not dependent on facts that contingently materialize after its exercise, neither violates the prospectivity condition. I am grateful to Stephen Perry for discussing this issue with me. turn, if the acts of public officials are to be distinguished from the lawless actions of the private persons who occupy their offices, the action of public officials must itself be authorized by law. Action that is not legally authorized is nothing more than a unilateral assertion of private power, which cannot place another under a legal obligation. Thus, the formal principles that make up Fuller's internal morality of law enter the unified theory, neither in terms of a duty that government owes to those that it binds by exercising public authority, nor as the aspiration internal to exercises of public authority, 9 but rather in terms of conditions under which persons who occupy public offices exercise public authority rather than private power.
The rule of law can be realized through a broad array of legislative arrangements that subjects the people as a whole to common lawgiving. In an autocratic society, legislative power is held by a single individual. In such a society, all private persons are passive subjects who are bound by law but unable to contribute to its enactment. In an aristocratic society, legislative power is held by the plurality of individuals who comprise the aristocracy. All private persons excluded from the ranks of the nobility are passive. Finally, in a democratic society, legislative power is held by the totality of its adult citizens, who are not passive subjects bound by laws of another's making but active citizens who contribute to the creation of the laws by which they are bound. The rule of law does not require that laws be promulgated democratically through representative institutions. Whether legislative power is held by a single person, a few persons, or the citizenry acting collectively through its representatives, private persons are subject to the governance of public institutions. A just democratic order cannot exist without the rule of law, but the rule of law does not entail the existence of a just democratic order. The distinction between the lawful exercise of public authority and the lawless imposition of private power does not indicate the mode through which laws should be promulgated.
Nor does this distinction determine the appropriate content of enacted laws. The justification of the principle of authority establishes that lawgiving cannot be publicly authoritative if it is incompatible with the interaction of private persons on terms of equal freedom or if its secrecy, vagueness, or ad hoc character prevents persons from acting in light of it. But the principle of authority does not impose a duty on government to give laws of a certain kind. Indeed, the principle of authority imposes no duty on government at all. The principle concerns the right of government to give law and the corresponding duty of private persons to obey, not the right of private persons and the corresponding duty of government. Private persons must act in conformity with valid public laws enacted by a public authority. The refusal to do so is a public wrong; that is, a wrong against the condition in which a plurality of persons can interact with one another in a manner that is consistent with the independence of everyone. Whereas wrongs that private persons commit against each other may be remedied by public institutions, a condition of public law could neither be created nor sustained if private persons had a right to disobey valid lawgiving. This claim is conceptual, not empirical. It would be empirical if it suggested that a causal relationship obtains between disobedience and the dissolution of society. Thus David Hume argued that a 'small degree of experience and observation suffices to teach us, that society cannot possibly be maintained without the authority of magistrates, and that this authority must soon fall into contempt where exact obedience is not paid to it.'
10 Such an empirical claim is susceptible to the empirical rebuttal that, in fact, legal systems persist even when obedience is not ubiquitous. 11 The conceptual claim focuses on the contrast between a legal system and a lawless condition. A legal system -comprised of legislative, adjudicative, and executive institutions that together subject a plurality of private persons to common norms -is the condition in which private persons can enjoy their independence in relation to one another. Such a condition would not be possible if private persons possessed the right to disregard laws that they deemed unjust, because such a right would regenerate the problems of lawless interaction by subjecting private persons to the unilateral lawgiving, judgment, and enforcement of other private persons. Private persons cannot interact with others on terms of equal freedom in the absence of the publicly authoritative institutions that comprise a legal system.
Legal and political philosophers usually claim that 'no respectable theory of political obligation ever claimed that a person is obligated no matter what to obey the laws of a legal system to which he or she is subject.' 12 This is exactly what the unified theory claims in its justification of public authority: all private persons must obey all valid laws. This does not mean, however, that anything that calls itself a legal system thereby is one or that any decree buttressed by violence is a valid law. After all, the justification of public authority at work in the unified theory provides its own ground for distinguishing between the public authority of a legal system, which all must obey, and private violence, which all may resist. Public authority is that which secures the independence of each person from the arbitrary power of every other. It follows that arrangements that are incompatible with securing the right of each person to independence in relation to every other cannot be publicly authoritative. In such cases, the principle of authority does not require persons to capitulate to the powerful -for the mere exercise of power, however organized, imparts no corresponding obligation. Rather, persons must submit themselves to the public authority of a legal system in which each private person can enjoy independence from the arbitrary power of every other. I return to this point below, in differentiating the legal pathology that results from the violation of the principle of authority (barbarism) from the legal pathology that results from the violation of the principle of justice (injustice). III 
The principle of justice
Legal and political philosophers often think about justice by taking the existence of publicly authoritative institutions for granted and then asking, all things considered, what purpose (or purposes) they should pursue. The diverse suggestions that ensue have a common structure. Each stakes a claim to how public authority should be exercised that is isolated from the terms on which public authority is justified. The unified theory of public law adopts a different approach in which the question of how public authority should be exercised is considered from the standpoint of its justification.
The justification of the principle of authority establishes that government has the right to enact, interpret, and enforce legal obligations that bind private persons. If the government has the right to exercise public authority over private persons, why may the government not exercise its power by using persons as instruments to further the purposes of those who occupy public offices? Perhaps societies of human beings are nothing more than 'so many herds of cattle, each with its ruler, who keeps guard over them for the purpose of devouring them.' 13 Within the unified theory, the right of government to exercise public authority over persons does not exist in a justificatory vacuum. The justification of public authority rests on the recognition that every person possesses a right to independence; that is, to freely determine and pursue his or her own purposes in a manner compatible with the right of others to the same. Government is not the owner of a thing, which has no rights, imposes no duties, and suffers no wrongs. Rather, it is the representative of a totality of independent persons, who must subject themselves to public lawgiving because rightful interaction is impossible without it. Since the right to exercise public authority presupposes the right of each person to independence, internal to the justification of public authority is an account of what it would mean for a system of publicly authoritative institutions to be morally adequate and what it would mean for public institutions to exercise their authority in a morally adequate manner. A legal system is adequate on its own internal moral standard to the extent that it reconciles the authority of law with the independence of every person bound by it. In turn, the exercise of public authority conforms to the terms of its justification to the extent that it is directed toward bringing the existing legal system into the deepest possible conformity with its own internal standard of adequacy -independence under law. Because the right of government to exercise public authority presupposes the right of every private person to independence, government cannot deny the right of persons to independence without thereby denying the justificatory basis of its own authority.
The principles of public law delineate the juridical situation of the parties to the public law relationship. The principle of authority relates the right of government to the corresponding duty of persons to obey all valid lawgiving. The principle of justice traverses the public law relationship from the opposite direction by relating the right of every person to just governance to the corresponding duty of the government. Since the duty to govern justly accompanies the mere exercise of public authority, all branches of government -legislative, adjudicative, and executivemust bring the existing legal order into the deepest possible conformity with the independence of every person subject to its lawgiving. Accordingly, the juridical situation of a private person differs from that of government. Every private person has a right to independence -that is, to formulate his or her own purposes and pursue them with his or her own means -subject to the systematic constraint that each person respects the same right of all others. Unlike a private person, a government lacks the right to determine its own end. Government enters the world with a single obligatory end, the realization of a system of law that conforms to the terms of its own justification. While private persons may direct their means toward the fulfilment of their own self-determined ends, the publicly authoritative means of government do not exist apart from their obligatory end.
14 The principles of public law address two distinctive problems that arise in a conceptually sequenced exploration of the implications of the right of persons to independence. The problem that the principle of authority addresses is that, in the absence of public institutions, the right of each person to interact with every other on terms of equal freedom remains subject to the arbitrary power of others. The solution to this problem of horizontal independence between private persons is, as I argued in the prior section, solved by the submission of private persons to a system of publicly authoritative institutions that establish, interpret, and enforce private rights. The second problem of independence presupposes the solution to the first. While the principle of authority addresses a problem that is unavoidable in the absence of public institutions, the principle of justice addresses a problem that can arise only when the public institutions comprising a government are present. The very public institutions that address the problem of horizontal independence by securing the right of each person to equal freedom in relation to every other create a problem of vertical independence because public institutions might themselves impose arbitrary restrictions on the freedom of one or more persons; that is, restrictions that a legal system does not itself require. This problem of vertical independence is addressed by the principle of justice, which requires government to direct all public authority toward bringing the legal order as a whole into conformity with the independence of each person bound by it. This requirement has implications for the way in which laws are enacted and the content of enacted laws.
Recall that the principle of authority requires that private persons submit to public lawgiving, but it draws no distinctions concerning the adequacy of autocratic, aristocratic, or democratic forms of lawgiving. In contrast, the principle of justice calls for the lawful transition to (and ongoing refinement of) a democratic legal order. Democracy is required because government must reconcile its public authority with the independence of those who are bound by it. In an autocracy, all persons are passive with respect to the legislative power. Autocracy is a defective mode of lawgiving because an arrangement in which persons are bound by laws that they cannot themselves enact imposes a constraint on the freedom of the ruled that freedom does not itself require. It thus fails to reconcile the public authority of the legal condition with the independence of all who are bound by it. In contrast, in an aristocracy some are passive with respect to the legislative power, while others are active. This arrangement is defective because it establishes ranks that defy the equality of independent persons insofar as some possess the right to contribute to the enactment of laws, while others are merely bound by laws of another's making. Democracy is the only mode of lawgiving in which citizens are both rulers and ruled, sovereign and subject. Democracy alone is capable of reconciling the independence of persons with legislative authority because it does not impose an arbitrary constraint on freedom by denying persons the right to contribute to the laws by which they are bound. Nor does it violate equality by granting this right to some persons but withholding it from others.
The duty to govern justly extends from the mode through which public legislation is to be enacted to its content. Because the right to exercise public authority over independent persons is always accompanied by a duty to govern justly, the duty applies to cases in which public authority is exercised by autocrats or aristocrats, but also to democracy, in which citizens collectively exercise legislative power through their representatives. Each citizen who contributes to public lawgiving must give laws to which all others, conceived of as free and equal members of a legal system, could consent. In a fully just democratic order, the system of laws that citizens collectively enact is fully congruent with the undiminished independence of each person bound by it. The ideal of public law is a democratic legal order in which each person contributes to and, in turn, is bound by lawgiving that leaves the independence of each person bound by it undiminished.
Perhaps one might object that the principle of justice is overly demanding because it requires government do the impossible by creating a democratic utopia in which the exercise of authority leaves the independence of each person bound by it undiminished. If the creation of such an order is impossible, then it cannot be obligatory. Thus, the objection concludes, the principle of justice must be rejected.
This objection overlooks a crucial distinction between the principles of public law. The principle of authority is the 'constitutive principle' of a legal system: it articulates what a legal system is and thereby enables a legal system to be distinguished from other entities within and beyond the juridical world. A legal system consists in the publicly authoritative institutions under which private persons can interact with one another on terms of equal freedom. In contrast, the principle of justice is the 'regulative principle' of a legal system: it articulates the relevant moral standard for assessing the extent of a legal system's adequacy and requires the government of a legal system to direct its public authority toward bringing the existing legal order into the closest possible approximation of that standard. Since the principle of justice is not a constitutive principle that calls for the creation of a perfectly just legal order, government is not under a duty to do the impossible by creating such an order, whether in a single moment or a finite series of acts. Rather, the duty of government is to exercise public authority in accordance with the terms on which that right is justified by bringing the existing legal system into the closest possible conformity with its own internal ideal of equal freedom under law. Regardless of whether a perfectly just legal system can be realized, it is certainly possible for existing legal systems to approximate the ideal of equal freedom under law to a greater or lesser extent. Because the principle of justice is a regulative principle that calls for the ongoing approximation of a just legal system rather than a constitutive principle that calls for the realization of a perfectly just one, the duty to govern justly does not exceed the boundaries of possibility.
That the principle of justice requires government to realize an ideal to the greatest possible extent does not mean that the unified theory of public law is an instrumental theory. Consider how the unified theory departs from, for example, the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham roots his theory in an ideal that exists apart from legal concepts, legal forms of reasoning, or legal institutions: 'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.' 15 On Bentham's view, an action is adequate to the extent that it produces utility, conceived of as pleasure and the absence of pain. 16 Thus, Bentham writes that a 'measure of government (which is but a particular kind of action, performed by a particular person or persons) may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it.' 17 For Bentham, as for instrumental theories generally, a legal system is simply a tool for realizing something that is of value apart from it. Proponents of instrumental theories of law differ about the particular value that 15 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879) at 1 (ch 1 at para 1). 16 Ibid at 1 (ch 1 at para 2). 17 Ibid at 3 (ch 1 at para 7).
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(2014) 64 UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS legal systems should pursue but agree that, if legal systems are of value, it is because they have a propensity to further the realization of some extrinsically valuable end. 18 Unlike the ideal of an instrumental theory, the ideal of public justice is not conceivable apart from a legal system. Public justice consists in an adequate relationship between the parties to the public law relationship, a people -a multitude of private persons subject to common lawgiving -and its government, the publicly authoritative institutions that represent the people as a whole. When publicly authoritative institutions are absent, neither of the parties to this juridical relationship is present and, consequently, questions about the adequacy of their relationship cannot arise. The internal ideal of a legal system is neither valuable nor conceivable apart from one.
The bifurcated structure of public law enables a distinction to be drawn between two distinct legal pathologies that are often blurred: injustice and barbarism.
19 'Injustice' consists in the violation of the regulative principle of public law. A law or legal condition is unjust to the extent that it fails to reconcile the authority of law with the vertical independence of every person bound by it. Public authority is exercised unjustly to the extent that it imposes (or fails to alleviate) arbitrary constraints on the freedom of persons bound by law. A constraint on freedom is arbitrary if it is not required to reconcile the freedom of persons under law. So, for example, an arbitrary law might compel citizens to 'salute the governor's hat' or forbid them to 'sniff the perfume of violets.' 20 Although such laws are arbitrary, they are, nevertheless, valid and demand obedience. As I have argued, persons must interact in a condition of public law, the presence of which is incompatible with the right to exempt oneself from valid laws deemed unjust. In contrast, 'barbarism' consists in the violation of the constitutive principle of public law. Barbarism is the pathology of a particular norm or general condition that renders horizontal independence insecure by subjecting the independence of one or more persons to the arbitrary power of others. Nazi Germany is the paradigmatic example of a barbarous regime. From the standpoint of the normative structure of public law, the problem with Nazism was not that it constrained the freedom of persons subject to law on arbitrary grounds that freedom itself did not require but that it sought to negate the freedom of particular persons in their interaction with others. Nazi power conceived of members of persecuted groups as possessing a strange form of legal personality in which they could commit but could not suffer wrongs. The persecuted could commit wrongs because Nazi power regarded them as owing duties to others. The persecuted could not suffer wrongs because Nazi power denied that the persecuted had rights by which the conduct of others toward them could be constrained. 21 In this barbarous condition, it was 'pointless for Jews to appeal to [courts] for the protection of their rights.' 22 As Nazism divested itself of the constitutive feature of legality, it became increasingly apparent that Nazism was not a lawful authority that protected the freedom of each person in relation to every other, but a lawless power to which all were subject. 23 In such a condition, private persons are under a duty to submit themselves to the authority of public institutions, which render rightful interaction possible. So conceived, the distinction between barbarism and injustice is not a matter of degree, as those who conceptualize barbaric lawlessness as extreme injustice claim. 24 Rather, the pathologies are different in kind insofar as each stems from the violation of a distinct principle of public law.
Earlier, in explicating the principle of authority, I argued that the exercise of public authority presupposes that the indicia of the rule of lawgenerality, publicity, prospectivity, clarity, consistency, and so forth -are, at least to some extent, satisfied. We can now situate these indicia in 21 Oxford J Legal Stud 1 at 7: 'The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be resolved in this way: The positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between statute and justice reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute, as "flawed law," must yield to justice.' For Radbruch, extreme injustice is not law. For the unified theory, public justice is the regulative principle appropriate for assessing the adequacy of an authoritative law or legal system. Norms or conditions that are not authoritative are neither just nor unjust.
AUTHORITY, JUSTICE, AND PUBLIC LAW: A UNIFIED THEORY 721
(2014) 64 UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS relation to the principle of justice. The undiminished satisfaction of the indicia of the rule of law is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of just governance. Their satisfaction is a necessary condition of just governance because public authority cannot be reconciled with the greatest possible freedom of each person bound by it if the laws are, for example, vague and so admit of interpretations that place arbitrary constraints on freedom. Similarly, laws that lack generality and culminate in ad hoc decisions are inimical to the realization of public justice because the disparate application of norms violates the equality of legal subjects and deprives them of a stable and calculable legal order in which to formulate and pursue their purposes. The latter problem also arises with respect to laws that are, to some extent, contradictory, secret, or retrospective. While the ideal of just governance requires the full satisfaction of the indicia of the rule of law, the satisfaction of these indicia is not a sufficient condition of just governance. Even an arbitrary law that prohibits persons from smelling the violets might nonetheless be formulated, enacted, and applied in such a way that the indicia of the rule of law are fully satisfied. By holding that the satisfaction of the indicia of the rule is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of just governance, the unified theory offers a far more rigorous standard for the evaluation of government conduct than Fuller's theory of law's internal morality. For Fuller, the duty of government toward its members is exhausted by the requirements of the rule of law. Because these principles concern solely the form of law, Fuller remarks that the internal morality of law 'is, over a wide range of issues, indifferent toward the substantive aims of law and is ready to serve a variety of such aims with equal efficacy.' 25 He illustrates his claim by noting that the internal morality of law is indifferent to the prohibition of contraception, 26 the criminalization of homosexuality, 27 or even the 'subjugation of women.'
28 From the standpoint, of the unified theory, each of these arrangements is problematic for the same reason: the right of government to exercise public authority must be directed toward a particular substantive aim, the equal freedom of persons under law. The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). As Fox-Decent explains, political authority consists in the right of the people to determine the substantive content of law; see ibid at 91. While political authority must operate within the limits of legal authority, which consists of an internal morality encompassing Fullerian principles of legality and a fiduciary duty of fairness (see ibid at 89), Fox-Decent holds that political authority may rightfully 'permit or prohibit . . . euthanasia, abortion, prayer in school, and so on'; ibid at 238.
The unified theory of public law consists in the principles that constitute and regulate the juridical relationship between a government and its members. The various bases on which the principles may be distinguished are summarized in Table 1 .
The principles of authority and justice form the normative architecture of a legal system as such. That these principles are apposite to legal systems in general distinguishes the unified theory from competing frameworks that attempt to ground the right of government to exercise public authority or the right of persons to membership in a just democratic order on particular facts or states of affairs that might be present in one legal system but absent in another. As I argued in the prior section, the principle of authority emerges from the systematic implications of the right of each person to equal freedom rather than, as other theorists propose, the justice of the rules, 29 the superior wisdom of the 30 or some voluntary act on the part of the ruled, whether consent 31 or the acceptance of a benefit. 32 Such justifications culminate in a patchwork in which the public authority of the state varies from law to law and from individual to individual. 33 The unified theory departs from these frameworks by holding that, in every legal system, all private persons must obey all valid laws. Like the right and duty encompassed by the principle of authority, the right and duty encompassed by the principle of justice follow from a feature common to legal systems as such: the mere presence of publicly authoritative institutions governing persons. The right of persons to just governance does not stem from a state of affairs that might obtain in one legal system but not in another, such as the presence of a democratic form of lawgiving, a rights-protecting constitution, or a public culture committed to ideas of free and equal citizenship. 34 Theories that generate a duty to govern justly from such features might succeed in explaining why a legal system characterized by liberal practices should govern in accordance with a liberal conception of justice. What they do not explain is why a legal system that lacks these practices must adopt them. Instead of treating these practices as conferring justification upon a conception of justice, the unified theory instead articulates a conception of justice that indicates why the adoption of practices of this kind is itself obligatory.
duty is the duty of justice. This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us.' 30 Joseph Raz, 'Authority and Justification ' (1985) 14 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 at 18-9 [emphasis in the original]: 'the normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to have authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.' 31 See e.g. Green, Authority, supra note 11 at 18. 32 A John Simmons, 'The Principle of Fair Play' (1979) 8 Philosophy and Public Affairs 307. 33 See e.g. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 80, arguing that the service conception of authority 'invites a piecemeal approach to the question of authority of governments, which yields the conclusion that the extent of governmental authority varies from individual to individual, and is more limited than the authority governments claim for themselves in the case of most people.' For a critical discussion of this aggregative approach, see Perry, 'Political Authority,' supra note 5 at 8, 63-6. 34 See e.g. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) at 39: '[J]ustice as fairness is framed for a democratic society. Its principles are meant to answer the question once we view a democratic society as a fair system of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, what principles are most appropriate to it. Alternatively: which principles are most appropriate for a democratic society that not only professes but wants to take seriously the idea that citizens are free and equal, and tries to realize that idea in its main institutions.'
IV Between anarchism and quietism
The central fault line in legal philosophy separates positivist theories, which hold that law is grounded in social facts, from non-positivist theories, which hold that law is grounded in moral norms. For centuries, legal positivists have claimed that non-positivist theories generate two dangerous kinds of confusion: anarchism and quietism. These views are dangerous because they collapse the distinction between what the existing law is and what law ought to be. As HLA Hart formulated the objection, the danger of anarchism is that 'law and its authority may be dissolved in man's conceptions of what law ought to be,' while the danger of quietism is 'that the existing law may supplant morality as a final test of conduct and so escape criticism.' 35 As the prior sections indicate, the unified theory is non-positivist insofar as it generates its principles of public law by elaborating on the systematic implications of the right of persons to independence. In this section, I will explain why the unified theory is not vulnerable to legal positivism's leading objection.
While legal positivism has undergone significant variation in its history, one constant has been the objection that positivists from Bentham to the present day have raised against non-positivist theories. Because positivism is premised on separating questions of social fact concerning the legal validity of a norm from moral questions concerning its merits, positivists invariably suppose that non-positivism collapses the distinction between these questions. The direction in which the distinction is collapsed produces two varieties of non-positivism, anarchism and quietism. Anarchism bends the concept of legal validity to fit the concept of morals or justice. Quietism takes the opposite path by bending the concept of justice to fit the concept of legal validity. Whereas the anarchist maintains that what is unjust cannot impose legal obligations, the quietist holds that what imposes legal obligations cannot be unjust. The failure of anarchist and quietist theories to distinguish between what the existing law is and what law ought to be generates a common problem. As Hart notes, neither the anarchist nor the quietist can endorse Bentham's 'motto of a good citizen' under 'a government of laws': 'To obey punctually; to censure freely.' 36 For the anarchist, the moral criticism of a law or a legal system leaves nothing to obey. For the quietist, the duty to obey a law or a legal system excludes the possibility of moral criticism. Thus, from their diverging outlooks, anarchists and quietists both deny the legal truism that a valid law or legal system might be unjust. The disagreement between anarchists and quietists is confined to the issue of whether the absence of justice indicates the absence of legality or whether the presence of legality indicates the presence of justice. In any case, the inadequacy of the non-positivist paradigm is evident: neither the anarchist nor the quietist can acknowledge the legal truism that a valid law or legal system might be unjust.
Generations of positivists have raised this objection against a range of non-positivist thinkers. Bentham attributed to Blackstone both the anarchic view that human laws were invalid if they conflicted with divine laws and an 'obsequious quietism' that fails to admit a distinction between what the law is and what it ought to be. 37 Similarly, Kelsen argued that non-positivist theories were either revolutionary or conservative. In its revolutionary guise, which Kelsen attributed to Locke, non-positivism calls 'into question the validity of the positive law by claiming that the positive law contradicts some presupposed absolute order.'
38 In its conservative guise, which Kelsen ascribed to Kant, non-positivism shows 'that the positive law is simply the emanation of a natural or divine order or of a system of reason -the emanation of an absolutely "right," just order.' 39 With these one-sided accounts of non-positivism in hand, positivists dismiss non-positivist theories as blind to a fundamental aspect of law's nature. Since non-positivist theories are either anarchist or quietist, and these frameworks deny the truism that a valid law might be unjust, positivists conclude that non-positivist theories cannot account for a fundamental aspect of law's nature.
The objection continues to be raised today. Scott Shapiro has recently argued that non-positivist theories -or as he terms them, 'natural law' theories -are inherently incapable of accounting for the possibility of evil legal systems:
By insisting on grounding legal authority in moral authority or moral norms, natural law theory rules out the possibility of evil legal systems . . . Just as theologians have struggled to explain how evil is possible given the necessary goodness of God, the natural lawyer must account for the possibility of evil legal systems given that the law is necessarily grounded in moral facts. Shapiro suggests that a non-positivist might respond to this objection in two ways. 41 The first involves rejecting the legal truism that a valid law might be unjust. The second involves admitting the inability to illuminate the truism but countering that the problems that legal positivism faces are nevertheless worse. Neither of these possibilities confronts the objection.
The positivist objection can be overcome because it poses a false dilemma. Positivists account for the legal truism that a valid law might be unjust by distinguishing the question of whether a particular norm is valid, which hinges on social facts concerning its pedigree, from moral questions concerning its merit. From this standpoint, a theory that purports to illuminate law solely in moral terms is suspect because valid norms are not invariably moral and moral norms are not invariably valid. Positivists therefore suppose that non-positivist theories must flout the legal truism by making the anarchist claim that conformity to morality is the condition of legal validity or the quietist claim that legal validity is indicative of conformity to morality. Both possibilities flout the truism because, in explaining the law in moral terms, the distinction between the question of a law's validity and the question of its morality is collapsed. The dilemma is false because the possibilities that it presents are not exhaustive. The further possibility, instantiated by the unified theory, turns on the idea that the part of morality that pertains to public law has a relational structure that differentiates the rights and duties of rulers and ruled. There is no irresolvable conflict between public authority and public justice because the rights and duties that they implicate are not incumbent on the same party to the public law relationship. As I have argued, private persons must obey valid lawgiving, while public institutions must reform the existing legal order. The positivist attack on its nonpositivist counterpart is decisive only if one conceives of morality as an undifferentiated domain in which what one should do does not depend upon the legal relationships in which one stands. Utilitarianism -the conception of morality that the early positivists affirmed -is such a conception of morality. 42 For it recognizes no distinction between what morality demands of private persons and what it demands of public officials. 43 The positivist objection, however, does not establish that non-positivists must adopt a conception of morality that is made in utilitarianism's image. Because the unified theory appeals to morality to formulate mutually implicating principles of authority and justice that constitute and regulate the public law relationship, it is neither anarchist nor quietist. Recall that anarchism is the view that what is unjust cannot be publicly authoritative. The unified theory cannot be anarchist because public justice is the standard for assessing the adequacy of a publicly authoritative arrangement. Thus, the claim that an arrangement is unjust presupposes that it is publicly authoritative. When individuals adopt the standpoint of the principle of justice and criticize the adequacy of the legal order or a publicly authoritative arrangement within it, neither the authority of the legal order nor the binding character of its laws is threatened. Further, the unified theory cannot be quietist. Recall that quietism is the view that what imposes legal obligations cannot be unjust. The unified theory is not quietist because the justification of the right of government to exercise public authority over persons implicates a demanding standard for assessing the moral adequacy of all publicly authoritative arrangements. The right to exercise public authority is always accompanied by a duty to bring the existing legal order into the closest possible conformity with this standard. The unified theory of public law jointly rejects the uncritical resignation of the quietist and the lawless freedom of the anarchist.
While the positivist objection threatens one-sided non-positivist theories that reduce public law to either public authority or public justice, the objection poses no threat to theories that appeal to morality in order to delineate the distinction between public authority and public justice. The unified theory thereby offers what positivists have long insisted was impossible, a non-positivist theory that explains how a law or a legal system might be valid even though it is unjust. One need not be a positivist to capture positivism's twin insights that what is just is not thereby valid and that what is valid is not thereby just.
The anarchist and quietist denial of the legal truism that a valid law or legal system might be unjust stems from a common confusion. I noted above that the principle of authority is the 'constitutive principle' of public law and that the principle of justice is its 'regulative principle. ' The former concerns what it means for a norm or condition to be lawful; the latter concerns what it means for a law or legal system to be adequate. The mistake that underlies both anarchism and quietism involves reducing the whole of public law to either its constitutive or its regulative aspect. The anarchist holds that the regulative principle of a legal system is also its constitutive principle. On this view, the ideal of public justice is not only the standard of a law or legal system's moral adequacy but the condition of its authority. That which is not perfectly just cannot be publicly authoritative. The quietist commits the opposing error by asserting that the constitutive principle of a legal system is also its regulative principle. On this view, the features of a particular law or legal system form the standard for assessing its moral adequacy, which means that no publicly authoritative arrangement can fail to be just. Because the unified theory distinguishes the constitutive principle of the public law relationship (the principle of authority) from its regulative principle (the principle of justice), the unified theory avoids collapsing into either anarchism or quietism.
The distinction between the principles of authority and justice give rise to an exhaustive classification of legal conditions. A 'just legal condition' satisfies the principles of authority and the internal ideal of public justice by uniting the authority of law with the independence of all who are bound by it. An 'unjust legal condition' satisfies the principle of authority but fails to satisfy the ideal of public justice. Existing legal systems are instances of this category and satisfy the ideal of public justice to varying extents. The duty of the public authority of such legal systems is to bring the legal order as a whole into the closest possible conformity with the vertical independence of each person bound by the authority of law. Finally, a 'lawless condition' fails to satisfy the principle of authority because the horizontal independence of private persons has not been secured. These possibilities are exhaustive: a legal condition can be valid and just, valid but unjust, or simply invalid. A legal system cannot be both invalid and just because public justice concerns the adequacy of the public law relationship between a people and its government. If the parties to this relationship are not present then questions about the adequacy of this relationship cannot arise. The same classification obtains with respect to particular norms: a norm can be valid and just, valid but unjust, or simply invalid. 44 44 The unified theory departs from the Lockean theory of institutional evaluation developed in A John Simmons, 'Justification and Legitimacy' (1999) 109 Ethics 739. Simmons defines 'legitimacy' as the exclusive moral right of the state 'to impose new duties on subjects by initiating legally binding directives, to have those directives obeyed, and to coerce noncompliers'; ibid at 752. For Simmons, state power is legitimate only when subjects have 'freely consented to the exercise of such power and only where that power continues to be exercised within the terms of the consent given'; ibid at 745. On this view, the state resembles a private association: each person within a state may choose at any time whether to become (or to remain) a member bound by its rules. In turn, Simmons explains that the justification of a state 'will typically give us moral reasons to refrain from undermining it and will typically give us moral reason to positively support that state'; ibid at 753. Although Simmons characterizes the notion of justification in terms of the justice of the state (ibid at 768) and legitimacy in terms of the state's authority over its subjects (ibid at 746, 749-50), his framework departs from the structure of the unified theory in a number of respects. The positivist objection follows from a chronic misconception regarding the dispute between positivist and non-positivist approaches. Legal positivists reject the view that a legal norm is validated by its moral merit or invalidated by its moral viciousness. Rather, whether a norm is legally valid depends on its sources; that is, whether it has been enacted through the relevant law-making procedure within a particular legal system. 45 Accordingly, positivists invariably conceive of non-positivists as defending the opposite view, which holds that a norm is legally valid not because it has been posited by the relevant institution but because of its moral merit. 46 But non-positivist theories are not confined to this view. For, as we have seen, the unified theory does not deny the legal positivist insight that positive law must be posited. On this central point, positivists and non-positivists may stand in agreement, albeit for their own distinctive reasons. A positive law is not valid by virtue of some non-institutional event or state of affairs, whether 'objective moral truth or God or the spirit of an age or the diffuse will of the people or the tramp of history through time, for example.' 47 The real disagreement between positivist and non-positivist theories lies elsewhere. not exist apart from the capacity to impose coercible legal obligations on its occupants. Unlike a private association, membership in a state is not optional but is rather the condition of rightful association between private persons. The second concerns the relationship between the fundamental components of each theory. Whereas Simmons holds that a state can be justified (or just) even if it is illegitimate or lacking in authority, the unified theory holds that any account of the justice of the state presupposes its authority. The duty of the state to govern justly follows from its capacity and entitlement to exercise public authority over independent persons. The third concerns the relationship that each theory envisages between the state and its inhabitants. A striking feature of Simmons's theory is that both justification and legitimacy concern the way in which private individuals should act with respect to the state. The result is that, while Simmons develops a rich conceptual framework for thinking about whether a state is justified and whether it enjoys the right to rule a particular group of individuals, his framework has no resources for thinking about the duty that a justified and legitimate state might owe its inhabitants. Such an omission impoverishes the resources of institutional evaluation that the theory offers. In contrast, the principles that comprise the unified theory formulate the rights and duties of both rulers and ruled. Positivist and non-positivist thought divides on the issue of whether the concept of law is exhausted by its positivity. As a non-positivist framework, the unified theory contends that there are two respects in which the concept of law extends beyond its positivity. The first concerns the possibility of positive law. The very notion of positive law, apart from what it enjoins, raises a question about how the government of a legal system could have the authority to change the normative situation of independent persons through its enactments. I argued above that the public authority of a legal system is justified because persons must interact with one another on terms of equal freedom, but cannot do so in the absence of publicly authoritative institutions that impose, interpret, and enforce law. Such a justification of public authority has important implications for the identification of valid law. Since public authority is that which enables private persons to interact with one another on terms of equal freedom, any arrangement that is incompatible with such interaction cannot be publicly authoritative. All public authority must be obeyed, but as the discussion of barbarism above suggests, not every norm or condition can be publicly authoritative.
The second disagreement, which concerns the principle of justice, follows from the first. The justification of the government's authority to bind independent persons through the enactment of positive law indicates both the internal standard for assessing the adequacy of every legal system and the duty that accompanies the exercise of all public authority. Thus, the unified theory affirms what positivist theories deny, 48 that a legal system or a valid law within one can be defective on its own internal standard of adequacy. So conceived, public justice is not 'a brooding omnipresence in the sky,' 49 a transcendent value extrinsic to the public law relationship but the internal moral standard for assessing the adequacy of all legal systems and all exercises of public authority. Because the unified theory of public law provides an integrated justification of public authority and public justice that retains the distinctiveness of each, it affirms what positivists have long insisted that all non-positivist theories must deny: a law (or a legal system) may be valid even though it is not perfectly just.
48 But see Shapiro, Legality, supra note 14 at 205-7, arguing that, from the standpoint of his planning theory of legal positivism, the substantive aim of a legal system is determined by its planners. Shapiro seeks to formulate a moral standard that is descriptively accurate of the aims that various legal systems in fact pursue. The unified theory instead formulates the substantive aim to which public authority, given the terms of its justification, should be directed. The principle of justice is not a fact about how public authority was exercised at a particular moment in time, but the relevant standard for assessing the moral adequacy of all exercises of public authority. 51 While positivists do not deny that the validity or invalidity of a norm may be salient from the standpoint of various moral theories, the positivist refrain that legal norms are valid by virtue of their enactment is intended to provide neither moral nor legal guidance. In contrast, the unified theory is anything but normatively inert. The principle of authority justifies the right of government to enact positive law and the corresponding duty of private persons to obey it, while the principle of justice articulates the right of private persons and the corresponding duty incumbent on government to bring the legal order into the deepest possible conformity with the independence of all who are bound by it. Such a framework provides a basis for evaluating the actions of all private persons and public officials from the moral standpoint of the public law relationship. Because private persons and public officials have distinctive rights and duties, what one should do depends upon the position that one occupies.
In his lucid contribution to the present issue, 'Two Logics of Authority: Reason and Fiat in Modern Law,' Arie Rosen traces the conflict between positivist and non-positivist theories of law to an underlying dispute about the way we think about the nature of authority in the circumstances of the modern world. Adopting the descriptive standpoint, Rosen argues that authority is not a 'unitary phenomenon, with a single structure and a single effect on our practical reasoning,' but a fragmented and complex notion that relies on two distinctive logics. 52 'Epistemic authority' invites us to follow its directives because they are reasonable, morally correct, or just. In contrast, 'decisionist authority' calls upon us to follow directives because they have been issued through the contingent exercise of fiat. When each of these conceptions of law's authority are given theoretical expression, two incompatible conceptions of the nature of law emerge: 'a positivist vision of law-as-fiat, and a non-positivist vision of law as inherently aspiring to correctness.' of reason and fiat emerge from a conceptually sequenced elaboration of the right of each individual to independence. So conceived, reason and fiat form the mutually implicating regulative and constitutive principles of a legal system. Rosen argues that reason and fiat reflect distinctive logics and indicate a fundamental 'inconsistency in the assumptions we employ in our legal and political lives.' 54 However, the conflict between these positions is only apparent. As Rosen explains, the 'phenomenon at the centre of my attention in this article is that of de facto practical authority.' 55 One has de facto authority when one is believed to have de jure authority. In turn, one has de jure authority when one has the right to change another's normative situation by, for example, conferring rights, powers, or immunities, or imposing coercible obligations. Whereas Rosen distinguishes two varieties of de facto authority, the unified theory proceeds from a justification of de jure authority. Insofar as Rosen's arguments do not engage the problem of de jure authority, 56 they pose no threat to an account that does.
In my exposition of public law, I begin with the problem of de jure authority for three reasons. The first is that no one denies that there is such a thing as de facto authority or that there might be different conceptions of it. On this point, Rosen and I stand in complete agreement: 'Discrepancy at this descriptive level should not strike us as particularly surprising.' 57 The theoretical controversy surrounding authority concerns whether there is ever de jure authority and, if so, how it might be justified. The second reason for focusing on de jure authority is that, insofar as de facto authority involves the belief that another has de jure authority, discussions of de facto authority presuppose an account of de jure authority. Although one cannot speak of de facto authority without raising the question of whether de jure authority is possible, the reverse is not true. It does not follow from the fact that someone has de jure authority that others believe that they do. The third reason for focusing on de jure authority is, as I have argued, that its justification provides the basis for providing an integrated account of the role of reason and fiat in public law. Insofar as the exercise of public authority must conform to its own justificatory basis, what a legal system is indicates what a legal system must become. Public law is a juridical relationship involving mutually implicating principles.
By 'relationship' I mean an association between two parties, neither of which can be considered in isolation from the other. Such relationships arise in various spheres of human life. By referring to someone as a brother or a sister, one conceives of a person as party to a relationship with another. An only child can be a boy or a girl, but cannot be a brother or a sister. The very notion of being a sibling is inherently relational because each party is situated within the context of an association. In some relationships, the parties are situated symmetrically. This is the case in relationships between siblings, friends, colleagues, and spouses. In others, the parties to the relationship are situated asymmetrically, as in the relationships between a doctor and a patient, a parent and a child, and a teacher and a student.
Public law is the asymmetric juridical relationship between a people and its government. A 'people' is a plurality of persons considered as a whole insofar as its members are subject to common lawgiving. A 'government' consists in the sum of institutions that subject a people to a common lawgiving. Public law is not reducible to either of these parties taken singly. In the absence of common lawgiving, one may find a crowd, but one cannot find a people. In the absence of a people that is subject to lawgiving, one may witness an act in which persons gather in a hall, give speeches, stand up and sit down, but one cannot find a government enacting law. The relational significance of the parties cannot be eliminated.
The character of the relationship between the parties is juridical. By 'juridical' I mean that the relationship is comprised of rights and corresponding duties that regard each party not as an isolated entity, but as the participants in a common association. The juridical character of this relationship can be unfolded by considering it from two interrelated standpoints. The 'principle of authority' concerns the right of government to exercise public authority and the corresponding duty of private persons to obey. The 'principle of justice,' in contrast, concerns the right of private persons to just governance and the corresponding duty of government to bring the existing legal system into the closest possible conformity with its own underlying justification. Public law is a juridical relationship rooted in principles of authority and justice that emerge from a conceptually sequenced exploration of the right of persons to equal freedom.
The relation between these principles is one of mutual implication. Whereas the common wisdom in legal philosophy that there is no single standpoint from which the claims of authority and justice can be jointly recognized, the unified theory holds that these claims are not merely compatible but mutually implicating. The right of government to exercise public authority over independent persons implicates a duty to govern justly. The right of independent persons to just governance presupposes the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. The unified theory of public law thereby articulates a common moral standpoint from which the distinctive claims of authority and justice may each be given their due.
